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Policy makers and analysts are often keen to know the extent
to which agricultural policies reduce international trade
flows, as an aid to prioritizing negotiating efforts and unilat-
eral reform agendas. There are various indicators used for
that purpose. The most common are nominal rates of assis-
tance to farmers and related consumer tax equivalents af-
fecting the prices that domestic consumers pay for farm
products. These measure the extent to which domestic
prices exceed those at a country’s border. An alternative in-
dicator is to use scalar index numbers from the Anderson
and Neary (1994, 2005) family of trade restrictiveness in-
dexes. These measures provide a single theoretically sound
indicator of the trade effects of different policy measures
that is directly comparable across time and countries. 
Drawing on the seminal theoretical work of Anderson and
Neary, two recent World Bank studies have attempted to an-
swer the question of how much agricultural policies restrict
trade nationally, regionally and globally. Kee, Nicita, and Ol-
erreaga (2009) estimate, among other indices, a single trade
reduction index (called an Overall Trade Restrictiveness
Index or OTRI in their paper) for 78 developed and devel-
oping countries for a snapshot in time (a single year in the
early or mid-2000s). Updates of these have been reported
regularly in the World Bank’s Global Monitoring Report.
Anderson and Croser (2009) provide alternative annual
estimates of a similar index (called a trade reduction index,
or TRI) for the agricultural sector of 75 developed and de-
veloping countries for the period 1955 to 2007, using a
methodology set out in Lloyd, Croser, and Anderson (2010).
This is based on sectoral estimates of the nominal rate of as-
sistance to farmers and the consumer tax equivalent (NRA
and CTE) of domestic and border policy measures that af-
fect each country’s agricultural trade. Those NRAs and
CTEs, provided by Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) are de-
rived by comparing domestic prices with prices of like prod-
ucts at a country’s border.2
In this paper, we compare the estimates of indices from
the Anderson and Croser (2009) country-level TRI estimates
(AC), and the Kee, Nicita, and Olerreaga (2008) OTRI esti-
mates, both available on the World Bank website (KNO).3
We explore how the two series complement each other, why
they differ, and how estimation of the trade restrictiveness of
agricultural policy can be improved in the future. 
Complementary Estimates of Agricultural
T rade Restrictiveness Indexes
Figure 1 presents the TRI aggregate estimates by AC for the
import-competing and exportables subsectors and the over-
all agricultural sector from 1960 to 2004. For developing
countries as a group, the trade restrictiveness of agricultural
policy was slightly increasing until the 1990s. Thereafter, it
declined, mostly due to reductions in Africa and Asia. For
high-income countries, the TRI time path was similar but
the causes differ. The aggregate results for developing coun-
tries are driven by the exportables subsector, which has
Recently the Bank has provided new indicators for monitoring the extent to which agricultural policies restrict inter-
national trade in farm goods. They come from two studies with differing methodologies and data sources, and each
provides less-than-perfect estimates. This note shows how and explains why the two indexes differ for some countries. been taxed, and the import-competing subsector, which is
being protected but by less than in high-income countries.
Policies in high-income countries, by contrast, support both
exporting and import-competing agricultural products and,
even though they favor the latter much more heavily, the
assistance to exporters somewhat offsets the antitrade bias
from the protection of import-competing products in terms
of impacts on those countries’ aggregate volume of trade in
farm products. This is reflected in figure 1a in a much
smaller TRI for high-income countries overall for agricul-
ture as compared with that for just the import-competing
subsector. 
Figure 2 presents the country-level detail from the two
studies for 2000–04 (for which there are 49 countries in
common), showing the KNO estimates for the agricultural
sector OTRI based on import tariffs and NTMs alongside
the AC estimates of the TRI for the import-competing agri-
cultural subsector, with countries ranked according to the
AC estimates. In both studies there is considerable diversity
in the country-level index estimates. In line with the results
in figure 1, all high-income and transition economies have
positive index estimates, indicating unsurprisingly that farm
policies in the import-competing sectors of these economies
were trade-reducing in that period. There is a high degree
of correlation between the estimated series in the two stud-
ies for many countries, especially the European Union (EU)
countries and most of Central and Eastern Europe’s transi-
tion economies. (Note that the common KNO estimate of
the OTRI for member countries of the EU as a whole—49
percent—is allocated to each member country in figure 2.) 
The differences between the two sets of estimates are
most noticeable at the top and bottom of figure 2(a). For
the EFTA countries (Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway) and
Japan—countries with a strong comparative disadvantage in
agricultural products—the AC estimates are much higher
than the KNO estimates; while for Australia, the United
States, and New Zealand—countries with a strong compar-
ative advantage in farm products—the AC estimates are
much smaller than the KNO estimates. 
Figure 2(b) presents the estimates for those developing
countries present in both data sets. Most countries had poli-
cies that were overall trade-reducing in the time period
shown. For a few developing countries, the TRI estimate by
AC is negative, indicating that their agricultural policies in
aggregate were implicitly subsidizing imports slightly. The
AC estimates for developing countries are generally smaller
than the KNO estimates. This tendency holds across the
three main developing country regions (Africa, Asia, and
Latin America). There are only a few developing countries
for which the KNO estimate is lower than the AC estimate,
most noticeably Ghana and Sri Lanka.
These  results  are  complementary. The AC  estimates,
based on historical data, enable greater insights into the re-
strictiveness of policy over time. Also, the AC estimates for
import-competing and exportable subsectors give a stronger
indication of the antitrade policy stance in many countries,
especially in previous decades, than is obtainable by exam-
ining  indexes  for  just  the  import-competing  industries.
However, the KNO series has the benefit that it can be read-
ily updated from published secondary data. 
Why the Two Studies’ Estimates Differ 
There are at least five reasons why the KNO and AC esti-
mates could differ. The most obvious empirical reason for the
series to differ is that distortions data are drawn from differ-
ent sources. In the KNO study, the main source is the WTO
Integrated Data Base and UNCTAD’s TRAINS database,
supplemented by WTO national Trade Policy Review reports.
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Figure 1. Trade Reduction Indexes for the Agricultural Sector’s
Import-Competing and Exportables Subsector and Overall, All
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Source: Anderson and Croser 2009.
Note: Regional aggregates are weighted using the average of the value of
production and consumption at undistorted prices. Agricultural domestic support data (which are included in
the KNO NTM estimate) are based on WTO members’ no-
tifications during the period 1995–98. By contrast, the data
used in the AC estimates are obtained from the World Bank’s
new Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database, which
provides price-equivalent distortion estimates for the pro-
duction and consumption sides of each commodity market
based on direct price comparisons. By calculating domestic-
to-border price ratios, the estimates include the price effects
of all tariff and NTMs plus any domestic price support meas-
ures (positive or negative), plus an adjustment for the output-
price equivalent of direct interventions in farm input markets.
Where multiple exchange rates operate, an estimate of the im-
port or export tax equivalents of that distortion are included
as well. The domestic-to-border price ratio is an appropriate
measure for the TRI analysis since it captures agricultural price
and trade policies by comparing like products at the same
point in the value chain, namely, the farm-gate level. 
The different sources of data (and their different years), and
the way they are used, can potentially explain some of the dif-
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Figure 2. Trade Reduction Indexes for the Agricultural Sector’s Import-Competing Subsector, Selected Focus Countries, 2000–04 (percent)
a. High-income and transition economies b. Developing economies
Sources: Anderson and Croser 2009; Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga 2008. 
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Anderson and Croser TRI, import-competing subsectorference in the estimates. The KNO estimates of their OTRI
are higher than the TRI estimates by AC for agricultural-
exporting countries potentially because of the methodology
used by KNO to capture the effects of NTMs. The KNO
method involves (1) estimating the restrictiveness of NTMs
on import volumes by product and country, and (2) using
import demand elasticities to transform the estimated im-
port quantity to an ad valorem tariff equivalent measure.
The  former  step  includes  in  the  estimating  equation  a
dummy variable for each NTM regardless of the extent of
restrictiveness of that measure. For countries such as Aus-
tralia, the United States, and New Zealand, almost half of
the OTRI estimates by KNO are due to NTMs. 
The AC method of domestic-to-border price comparisons
for like products at the farm-gate level of the value chain,
by contrast, provides an ad valorem equivalent directly.
While such measures based on price comparisons are likely
to be more accurate for covered products, there are many
food products imported for consumers that are not covered
in the study because they were not important in domestic
production (see below). Also, generating such measures can
be computationally intensive, and updates are not yet as
mainstreamed as the annual updates of UNCTAD’s TRAINS
database.
The second reason to expect differences between the two
series is that the AC estimates are computed with the sim-
plifying assumption within each country that domestic price
elasticities of supply are equal across commodities, and the
same for domestic price elasticities of demand. That assump-
tion allows the AC estimates to be constructed by aggregat-
ing distortions using as weights just the sectoral share of each
commodity’s domestic value of consumption or production
at undistorted prices. The OTRI estimates, calculated with
a full set of country- and commodity-specified import de-
mand elasticities, has the benefit of capturing precisely the
differential responses of various commodity trades to a given
policy distortion.
The third reason to expect differences between the two
series is that the KNO estimates are generated from a very
disaggregated data set (at the HS six-digit tariff line level,
which has more than 4,000 tariff lines) whereas the AC es-
timates are based on a sample that averages just 15 farm
products per high-income country and 9 per developing
country (so as to cover around 70 percent of the gross value
of each country’s farm production). If the level of disaggre-
gation had been the only difference between the two series,
the greater level of disaggregation in the KNO study would
result in more accurate TRI estimates. This is because the
KNO estimates correctly aggregate distortions from the
more disaggregated base, and the estimates reflect the full
diversity of distortions across industries within the agricul-
tural subsector under study. The OTRI for industries dis-
torted by import restrictions alone (the KNO approach)
would give a higher estimate than a comparable TRI esti-
mate by AC because the former would be based on data that
contain a fuller diversity of distortions across the import-
competing subsector.4
The fourth reason why the two series could differ is the
difference in the products included in the two studies. The
KNO estimates are based on a methodology where distor-
tions to import-competing products are weighted by ob-
served  import  values  (multiplied  by  import  demand
elasticities, as per the Anderson/Neary formulation of the
index). That is, the KNO estimates will only include prod-
ucts for which there are nonzero imports at the HS six-digit
level, regardless of their importance to domestic production
or consumption. By contrast, the AC estimates are com-
puted using a methodology where the weights are produc-
tion  and  consumption  based. Anderson  and Valenzuela
(2008) select agricultural products for inclusion in the data-
base because they are important contributors to the gross
value of national production at undistorted prices, thereby
minimizing the number of products needed to achieve the
target coverage of 70 percent of that total value. The AC es-
timates are based on policy distortions to those 70 percent
of  products,  including  both  import-competing  and  ex-
portable subsectors. The TRIs are computed for the subsec-
tors separately as well as together; and they can be extended
to include the nontradables subsector as well. 
If the only difference between the two series was that
KNO limit their sample to products facing actual import
competition, the AC estimates would give a more accurate
indication of distortions to the domestic agricultural markets
of a country because they include both import-competing
and export subsectors. However, the AC estimates could be
improved by including more coverage of production and
consumption beyond the current 70 percent level. At the
same time the KNO methodology and OTRI estimates
could be improved by including exportable products. 
The fifth and related reason for the difference between the
two series is that the KNO estimates include only import-
restricting policy distortions, whereas the AC estimates are
based on all distortions (positive and negative) to import-
competing and exportable industries. That set includes im-
port  and  export  taxes  and  subsidies  and  ad  valorem
equivalents of nonprice border measures such as quantita-
tive trade restrictions or technical standards, the implicit
trade taxes associated with multiple exchange rates, as well
as domestic production or consumption taxes and subsidies
and the output subsidy equivalent of farm input subsidies
net of input taxes.5
Differences in the estimated TRI series due to differing
extents of product disaggregation, product coverage, and in-
strument coverage are evident from a comparison of the
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The first comparison is between the KNO estimates and the
TRI estimates by AC for import-competing products in each
country (figure 3). Given the five differences between the
two series analyzed above, it is not possible to say a priori
whether the TRI estimates by AC should be larger or smaller
than the KNO counterparts. For example, while the latter
will include many more products—including ones involving
little or no restriction because there is no local industry de-
manding protection from import competition—it will only
include import restrictions and hence only a subset of dis-
tortions to agricultural trade (albeit probably the most dis-
tortive subset). For high-income and transitional economies,
where almost all import distortions are protective, the AC
estimates (with fewer sectors) are higher than KNO esti-
mates, most likely because the effect of including more
lightly protected products dominates. This could be partly
why temperate-climate countries such as Japan, Switzer-
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Figure 3. Trade Reduction Indexes for the Agricultural Import-Competing Subsector and for All Covered Tradable Farm Products, Selected
Focus Countries, 2000–04 (percent)
a. High-income and transition economies b. Developing economies
Source: Anderson and Croser 2009.
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Anderson and Croser TRI, all covered tradablesland, Norway, and Iceland, despite having highly protected
import-competing agricultural sectors, have low OTRIs:
many of their imports from tropical countries would face
few if any restrictions (figure 3a). In African countries such
as Zambia, where there have been import subsidies for sta-
ple foods, the TRI estimate is lower than the OTRI, suggest-
ing that the effect of including more policy instruments
dominates the explanation for the difference between esti-
mates (figure 3b). 
The second comparison is between the KNO estimates
and AC’s TRI estimates for all covered tradables (both ex-
portable and import-competing sectors). This brings the two
series closer together in terms of product coverage, but the
AC estimates also include distortions to exportable indus-
tries. Once again it is not possible to say a priori whether the
AC estimates should be larger or smaller than the KNO es-
timates. The extent to which the increased product coverage
in the AC estimates brings them closer to the KNO esti-
mates will depend on the type and extent of distortions to
exportable versus import-competing subsectors. A compar-
ison and figures 2 and 3 reveal that when exportable sub-
sectors are included to generate a TRI for all agricultural
tradables, the TRI estimates generally are lower in 2000–04
than those involving just import-competing subsectors. This
is because the exportable subsector tends to be less trade re-
stricted than the import-competing subsector. For example,
Switzerland  and  Iceland  have  large  export  subsidies  in
2000–04 for several agricultural products (Josling 2009).
These trade-expanding subsidies reduce the TRI estimate
quite significantly when the exportable subsector is in-
cluded. In contrast, Norway provides much lower assistance
to its exportable subsector than to its import-competing
farmers, so the inclusion of exporting industries has a less
significant effect on that country’s TRI estimate (compare
the grey shaded bar for Norway in figures 2 and 3). As for
developing countries, Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Zambia
each have trade-reducing policies in their exportable sub-
sector, which leads to a higher TRI estimate for them in fig-
ure 3 than in figure 2. 
Conclusion
In recent years very considerable progress has been made in
answering the question: how much do agricultural policies
restrict trade? The two World Bank studies surveyed here
have approached the question from different angles, each
producing complementary results as to the restrictiveness of
import-competing agriculture in developed and developing
countries in the 2000s. The Anderson and Croser (2009) es-
timates have the benefit of being part of a longer time-series
of estimates, giving historical context to the current policy
position. The import-competing subsector estimates can be
compared to estimates for the other subsectors of agricul-
ture (exportables and nontradables), thereby offering further
insight into the antitrade bias in different countries’ policies.
The Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008) indexes, constructed
from a somewhat different methodology and data set, have
the benefit of allowing for a comparison between the trade
restrictiveness of agricultural and manufacturing import-
competing policies, offering insight into the extent of the
sectoral bias in protectionist national trade policies (usually
favoring agriculture). The KNO estimates are more theoret-
ically precise than the AC estimates because they are based
on a more disaggregated data set and they capture the dif-
ferential responses of various commodity trades to a given
policy distortion through the inclusion of elasticity data. Be-
cause the KNO estimates are based on a routinely published
data source, they can be regularly updated at low cost.
The level of disaggregation, the proportion of the sector
included in the aggregation, and the types of policy instru-
ments included in the analysis are all important determi-
nants of indices of agricultural trade restrictiveness. The
more prevalent are NTMs, the more difficult it will be to
avoid domestic-to-border price comparisons to get an accu-
rate measure. But such price comparison studies need to in-
clude not only products important in domestic production
but also those important in domestic consumption but not
be produced domestically (such as tropical products in tem-
perate countries, and conversely). Such price comparison
studies are laborious and therefore expensive. Nonetheless,
they are being undertaken regularly by the OECD for grad-
ually more and more countries, including for a large sample
of African countries under a new joint project with the FAO
and national governments funded by the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation. Adding TRIs to the list of calculated in-
dicators by the OECD would enrich the policy analysis that
will be possible with those estimates, without requiring any
more  information  that  is  currently  needed  to  estimate
NRAs/CTEs or PSE/CSEs if one is willing to adopt some
restrictive assumptions about price elasticities.
One final point: the TRI, with its inclusion of export sub-
sectors, will be especially useful when assessing the restric-
tiveness of policy responses to spikes in international food
prices, as in 2008 when many developing countries placed
restrictions on exports of food. Efforts are currently under
way to update the Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and An-
derson and Croser (2009) databases to include that year.
Notes
1. Correspondence: kym.anderson@adelaide.edu.au. This
note is a product of a World Bank research project on Dis-
tortions to Agricultural Incentives (see www.worldbank.org/
agdistortions). The authors are grateful for the distortion es-
6 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremisetimates provided by the authors of the various country case
studies, for funding from Trust Funds provided by the gov-
ernments of the Netherlands (BNPP), the United Kingdom
(DfID), and Ireland, as well as from the Australian Research
Council.
2. See also Anderson (2009) for a summary. The Ander-
son and Croser (2009) database also contains estimates of a
TRI for the  market of individual commodities, based on the
methodology of Croser, Lloyd, and Anderson (2010). These
measures are novel because all previous work has focused
on constructing index numbers from the perspective of a
single country.
3. The Kee et al. (2008) estimates are slightly different to
those in Kee et al. (2009), but we use the former because
they include a disaggregation of the OTRI into manufactur-
ing and agricultural subsectors of each national economy.
4. Another index reported in both the KNO paper and
the AC database is a welfare reduction index, for which the
variance of sectoral distortions is a component of the index.
Space constraints preclude a discussion of welfare impact
estimates.
5. As noted, the AC methodology can be extended to in-
clude domestic distortions to the nontradables subsector of
agriculture (Croser and Anderson 2010). By definition this
subsector involves no trade distortions, so its inclusion in the
set of products necessarily will lower the sectoral TRI esti-
mates.
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